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The Role of the Social Sciences in Determining the
Constitutionality of Capital Punishment*
Welsh S. White**
I. INTRODUCTION
In June, 1972, the Supreme Court unexpectedly rendered a deci-
sion which apparently spared the lives of more than 600 death row
inmates and invalidated nearly all of the capital punishment legis-
lation then in effect.' Each member of the 5-4 majority wrote a
separate opinion in support of a per curiam order holding that sent-
ences of death entered pursuant to three statutes vesting capital
sentencing discretion in a jury were contrary to the cruel and unu-
sual punishment clause of the eighth amendment.2 Although Justice
Brennan and Justice Marshall held that capital punishment per se
is in violation of the eighth amendment, the three other concurring
Justices limited their holding to a conclusion that the imposition of
a death sentence pursuant to the then prevailing system of capital
punishment was unconstitutional. Two of these Justices, White and
Stewart, explicitly reserved decision on the constitutionality of
mandatory capital punishment;3 all three condemned the jury-
discretionary system because of the pattern of executions that it
produced.'
Numerous states have enacted new capital punishment legisla-
tion designed to eliminate the constitutional defects identified by
these three Justices. Broadly speaking, the new statutes may be
* This article will appear in modified form in the J. OF ORTHOPSYCHIATRY, which retains
all copyrights to this article.
**Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law.
1. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). The scope of the Court's opinion is recognized
by the dissenting Justices; see, e.g., id. at 417 (Powell, J., dissenting):
The Court's judgment removes the death sentences previously imposed on some 600
persons awaiting punishment in state and federal prisons throughout the country. ...
The capital punishment laws of no less than 39 States and the District of Columbia
are nullified.
Id. (footnote omitted).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
3. 408 U.S. at 310-11 (White, J., concurring); id. at 307-09 (Stewart, J., concurring).
4. For an elaboration of the rationale applied by each condemning the application of the
jury-discretionary system of capital punishment see text at notes 24-31 infra.
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divided into two categories: the "mandatory" statutes and the
"guided discretionary" statutes. The "mandatory" statutes provide
an automatic sentence of death upon conviction of specifically de-
fined crimes such as first degree murder,' or a more narrowly drawn
category of homicide;' the "guided discretionary" statutes provide
the jury with a list of aggravating and mitigating circumstances and
allow them to impose the death penalty for murder' (and in some
cases rape),' if at least one aggravating circumstance and no miti-
gating circumstances are present.'
Under the doctrine accepted by Furman and earlier eighth
amendment cases, the constitutionality of the new statutes will be
determined by testing them against "evolving standards of de-
cency." 10 The Court indicated in Furman that this testing would
include an examination of material drawn from the social sciences."
The purpose of this article is to illuminate the role of empirical data
in resolving the constitutional validity of the new statutes. In pur-
suit of this objective, part II of the article will examine the use of
empirical data made by the Justices in Furman; using the ap-
proaches developed in Furman as a bench-mark, part III will discuss
the probable role of the social sciences in determining whether the
new statutes are valid under the rationale applied in Furman; and
part IV will explore the role of the social sciences in resolving other
issues relevant to testing the validity of the new statutes.
II. Furman's USE OF EMPIRICAL DATA
In Furman, all nine Justices made some use of empirical data, but
there were significant differences between not only the majority and
the dissent, but also between the individual members of the major-
ity regarding their views of both the Court's role in reviewing em-
5. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (Supp. 1974) (death penalty upon conviction for first
degree murder).
6. E.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:30(4) (1974) (murder with intent to kill more than one
person).
7. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 189, 190.1-.3, 209 (West Supp. 1974).
8. E.g., GA. CODE § 27-2534 (1973).
9. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5) (Supp. 1974).
10. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (Warren, C.J.) (plurality opinion). Every one
of the nine justices in Furman expressly or impliedly accepted this test or a similar one as
articulating the appropriate eighth amendment standard. See, e.g., 408 U.S. at 383 (Burger,
C.J., dissenting); id. at 242 (Douglas, J., concurring).
11. See text at notes 15-34 infra.
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pirical data and the data's relevance to the constitutional issues.
Despite these differences, all of the concurring Justices ultimately
agreed that because of empirical data relating to the application of
jury-discretionary capital punishment, death sentences imposed
pursuant to that system of capital punishment are unconstitutional.
Moreover, in finding capital punishment unconstitutional per se,
Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall relied, in part, upon empiri-
cal evidence relating to the death penalty's efficacy as a deterrent;
at least two other members of the majority indicated that if they
were required to decide the ultimate constitutionality of capital
punishment, this type of empirical evidence would be extremely
relevant, if not dispositive. Thus, it would appear fruitful to explore
the Court's use of empirical evidence in dealing with these two
issues.
A. The Death Penalty's Application
The majority's condemnation of jury-discretionary capital pun-
ishment was premised upon conclusions that under this system the
death penalty is applied arbitrarily, 2 infrequently,13 and discrimi-
natorily. 4 In reaching these conclusions, all members of the major-
ity made use of empirical data. Justice Douglas relied upon empiri-
cal studies showing discriminatory application of the death penalty
in various states over various periods of time 5 and statements by
knowledgeable authorities"6 to conclude that under the jury-
discretionary system the death penalty was imposed and carried out
on "only those in the lower strata, only those who are members of
an unpopular minority or the poor and despised."' 7 He found this
evidence sufficient to render the death penalty violative of the
12. 408 U.S. at 313 (White, J., concurring); id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring).
13. Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring); id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring).
14. Id. at 242 (Douglas, J., concurring).
15. Id. at 250-51. Douglas refers to the Koeninger study in Texas between 1924 and 1968
which indicated an unequal application of the death penalty in that blacks received the death
penalty more often than whites in rape cases and in several co-defendant situations, and the
Bedau study in Pennsylvania covering the period 1914 to 1958 which indicated that the death
sentence was commuted in only 11.6% of the Negro cases, while the sentences of 20.2% of
the whites awaiting death were commuted. See H. BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA
474 (rev. ed. 1967); Koeninger, Capital Punishment in Texas, 1924-1968, 15 CRIME & DELIN.
132, 141 (1969).
16. See 408 U.S. at 251-52.
17. 408 U.S. at 248 n.10. Justice Marshall draws upon similar empirical evidence to reach
a similar conclusion. However, this conclusion is not necessary to Justice Marshall's judg-
ment. Id. at 364-66.
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"cruel and unusual punishment" clause because:
[T]he death penalty inflicted on one defendant is "unusual"
if it discriminates against him by reason of his race, religion,
wealth, social position, or class, or if it is imposed under a
procedure that gives room for the play of such prejudices."I
Justices White, Stewart and Brennan relied upon empirical data
to determine that the penalty is applied arbitrarily and infre-
quently, a conclusion which is critical to the judgment of White and
Stewart. Through examination of sources which show the declining
number of executions and the number of crimes committed an-
nually for which death is the authorized penalty," Justice Brennan
concluded that the death penalty "is inflicted in a trivial number
of the cases in which it is legally available.""0 Drawing upon this
conclusion, Justice Brennan asserted that because of the infrequent
executions, "it is highly implausible that only the worst criminals
or the criminals who commit the worst crimes are selected for this
punishment."" He goes on to say that no rational basis has been
asserted for distinguishing "the few who die from the many who go
to prison,"" and that, in fact, the procedures applied in capital
cases are "not constructed to guard against the totally capricious
selection of criminals for the punishment of death. 21 3 Based upon
this analysis of the data, Justice Brennan concluded that there is a
strong probability the death penalty is being inflicted arbitrarily, 2
and that taken in conjuction with his other conclusions, this proba-
bility is sufficient to render capital punishment violative of the
eighth amendment.
Justice Stewart relied upon the sources cited by Justice Brennan
and upon additional data cited by Chief Justice Burger to conclude
that "the penalty of death is infrequently imposed for murder, and
. . . its imposition for rape is extraordinarily rare."'2 He proceeded
to the further conclusion that the condemned are a "capriciously
selected random handful upon whom the sentence of death has in
18. Id. at 242 (Douglas, J., concurring).
19. Id. at 291-93 (Brennan, J., concurring).
20. Id. at 293.
21. Id. at 294.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 295.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
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fact been imposed." 6 Justice Stewart never fully articulated the
basis for the latter conclusion. He did not say that the arbitrary
infliction of the death penalty had been proven, but merely that no
basis can be discerned for singling out the condemned except the
"constitutionally impermissible basis of race." 7 Yet, he concluded
that "racial discrimination has not been proved, and I put it to one
side." 8 His opinion thus appears to imply that the absence of a
discernible basis for distinguishing the few who are condemned from
the many who are spared necessitates a conclusion that the death
penalty is arbitrarily inflicted. Whether this step follows because of
probabilities, 9 an allocation of the burden of proof to the state on
this point, or his own evaluation of the evidence30 is unclear. The
conclusion that the death penalty is rarely and arbitrarily applied
leads, however, to an unequivocal judgment:
I simply conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death
under legal systems that permit this unique penalty to be so
wantonly and so freakishly imposed.3 '
Justice White's judgment is also premised upon a conclusion that
under the jury-discretionary system the death penalty is arbitrarily
and infrequently applied. Although he referred to the data cited by
the other Justices, Justice White found that he could not "'prove'
[his] conclusion from these data. ' 3 Emphasizing that he must
"arrive at judgment," Justice White justified his conclusion on the
basis of his own "almost daily exposure to the facts and circumstan-
ces of hundreds and hundreds of federal and state criminal cases
involving crimes for which death is the authorized penalty."' 3' He
agreed with Justice Stewart in finding that the conclusion that the
jury-discretionary system resulted in the infrequent and arbitrary
imposition of capital punishment necessitated a finding that death
sentences rendered pursuant to that system of capital punishment
26. Id. at 309-10 (footnote omitted).
27. Id. at 310 (footnote omitted).
28. Id. (footnote omitted).
29. Compare Justice Brennan's analysis in text at note 21 supra.
30. Compare Justice White's analysis in text at notes 32-34 infra.
31. 408 U.S. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring).
32. Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
33. Id.
34. Id.
1974
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were in violation of the eighth amendment.3 5
The dissent differed from the majority in its view of both the
weight which should be assigned to empirical proof and the role of
the Court in reviewing empirical evidence. With respect to the death
penalty's application, the dissent took the position that proof the
death penalty has been applied discriminatorily or arbitrarily and
infrequently would not establish a violation of the eighth amend-
ment.35 Nevertheless, the dissent reviewed the empirical evidence
and found it to be constitutionally insufficient to establish a dis-
criminatory or arbitrary pattern of executions.
Chief Justice Burger's dissent asserted that there was no empiri-
cal basis for concluding that the death penalty is imposed arbitrar-
ily.
[Tihe sources cited contain no empirical findings to under-
mine the general premise that juries impose the death penalty
in the most extreme cases. One study has discerned a statisti-
cally noticeable difference between the rate of imposition on
blue collar and white collar defendants; the study otherwise
concludes that juries do follow rational patterns in imposing
the sentence of death. 37
The Chief Justice's dissent also noted that the empirical evidence
relating to the death penalty's discriminatory application was not
sufficiently current:
The statistics that have been referred to us cover periods when
Negroes were systematically excluded from jury service and
when racial segregation was the official policy in many States.
Data of more recent vintage are essential.38
In support of the conclusion that proof of discrimination was in-
sufficient both the Burger and Powell dissents cited with approval
the Eighth Circuit case of Maxwell v. Bishop.3 Maxwell decided
that extensive empirical evidence showing that in southern rape
35. Id. at 314.
36. Id. at 447-50 (Powell, J., dissenting); id. at 397-99 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 389 n.12 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The study referred to by the Chief Justice
is Note, A Study of the California Penalty Jury in First-Degree-Murder Cases, 21 STAN. L.
REv. 1297 (1969). He also cited and apparently relied upon H. KALVEN & H. ZIEsEL, THE
AMERICAN JURY 434-49 (1966).
38. 408 U.S. at 390 n.12.
39. 398 F.2d 138 (8th Cir. 1968).
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cases the death penalty was discriminatorily applied against black
men convicted of raping white women was insufficient to establish
a violation of the equal protection clause. In addition to finding the
evidence not sufficiently current, Maxwell noted that the study
failed to take every variable into account 0 and did not relate specifi-
cally to the county where the defendant was tried and convicted."
Emphasizing that the defendant has the "burden of demonstrating
discrimination,' 4 Justice [then Judge] Blackmun's opinion con-
cluded that it was unlikely that "statistics will ever be [Maxwell's]
redemption.' 3 The dissent's apparent approval of Maxwell high-
lights the divergence between the dissent and majority with respect
to the type of empirical proof each would require to establish a
discriminatory or arbitrary application of the death penalty.
B. The Death Penalty's Efficacy as a Deterrent
After taking account of "logical hypotheses" advanced in favor of
the position that the death penalty is superior to other punishments
as a deterrent," Justice Marshall reviewed a number of studies re-
lating to the death penalty's efficacy as a deterrent," and found that
the conclusions drawn from these studies supported a United Na-
tions committee's statement that "'the data which now exist show
no correlation between the existence of capital punishment and
lower rates of capital crime.'"" In evaluating the impact of this
evidence, Justice Marshall concluded that although
[the] abolitionists have not proved non-deterrence beyond a
reasonable doubt, they have succeeded in showing by clear and
convincing evidence that capital punishment is not necessary
as a deterrent to crime in our society. This is all that they must
do. We would shirk our judicial responsibilities if we failed to
40. Id. at 147.
41. Id. at 146.
42. Id. at 147.
43. Id. at 148.
44. 408 U.S. at 347-48 (Marshall, J., concurring).
45. Id. at 348-52. Justice Marshall gives especial weight to the study conducted for the
A.L.I. MODEL PENAL CODE by Professor Sellin. See T. SELur, 'NE DEATH PENALTY, A REPORT
FOR THE MODEL PENAL CODE 5 (1959) [hereinafter cited as SELLIN STUDY]. Sellin found no
correlation between the homicide rate and either the presence or absence of the murder
sanction or executions. Further, abolition and/or reduction of capital punishment does not
affect homicide rates.
46. 408 U.S. at 353.
1974
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accept the presently existing statistics and demanded more
proof. 7
The determination that the death penalty is no more effective than
other punishments as a deterrent was one of several findings which
led Marshall to conclude that the death penalty is excessive and,
therefore, in violation of one of the two relevant prongs of the cruel
and unusual punishment clause.48
Drawing upon the same empirical data cited by Justice Marshall,
Justice Brennan found that the data "uniformly indicates, although
it does not conclusively prove, that the threat of death has no
greater deterrent effect than the threat of imprisonment."' 9 Claims
to the contrary, purportedly based on common human experience,
were not persuasive to Justice Brennan because of the fact that
under our present system the death penalty is not invariably or
swiftly applied:
Whatever might be the case were all or substantially all eligi-
ble criminals quickly put to death, unverifiable possibilities
are an insufficient basis upon which to conclude that the threat
of death today has any greater deterrent efficacy than the
threat of imprisonment."
This determination was necessary to Justice Brennan's conclusion
that the death penalty was a severe penalty which was excessive and
thus in violation of one of the four prongs of the cruel and unusual
punishment clause.5I
Justice White's conclusion that the jury-discretionary death pen-
alty no longer presents a credible deterrent is central to his judg-
ment. In reaching this conclusion, White did not rely upon empiri-
cal evidence as such but stated that "common sense and experi-
ence" teach us that seldom-enforced laws cannot serve as an effec-
tive deterrent." His determination that the jury-discretionary death
47. Id.
48. Marshall also concluded that the death penalty is in violation of the eighth amend-
ment because it is "morally unacceptable to the people of the United States at this time in
their history." 408 U.S. at 360.
49. Id. at 301 (Brennan, J., concurring).
50. Id. at 302 (footnote omitted).
51. Id. at 305. Justice Brennan also concluded that the death penalty is cruel and unusual
because it is "so severe as to be degrading to the dignity of human beings," id. at 271; a severe
penalty which is arbitrarily inflicted by the state, id. at 274; and a punishment which is
unacceptable to contemporary society, id. at 277.
52. Id. at 312 (White, J., concurring).
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penalty is infrequently and arbitrarily enforced led directly to the
conclusion that such punishment violates the eighth amendment
because it ceases to be a credible deterrent or measurably to contrib-
ute to any other end of punishment in the criminal system.5 3
Both White and Stewart specifically noted that they were not
passing upon the constitutionality of a statute which imposed a
mandatory death sentence upon conviction of a capital crime. 4 Al-
though Justice White said nothing about the relationship between
empirical evidence relating to deterrence and the resolution of this
issue,55 Justice Stewart was less circumspect. Resolving the consti-
tutional validity of these statutes would, under his view, require the
Court to
decide whether a legislature . . could constitutionally deter-
mine that certain criminal conduct is so atrocious that so-
ciety's interest in deterrence and retribution wholly outweighs
any considerations of reform or rehabilitation of the perpetra-
tor, and that, despite the inconclusive empirical evidence, only
the automatic penalty of death will provide maximum deter-
rence.
56
Obviously, this passage raises as many questions as it answers. How
can a court or legislature measure a punishment's retributive effect?
Assuming the death penalty does satisfy a legitimate need for retri-
bution, what effect, if any, will this have on the degree to which the
legislature will be required to justify the punishment as a deterrent?
Interpreted literally, Justice Stewart's language implies that the
death penalty will only be upheld if it provides "maximum deter-
rence." What is the meaning of this phrase? Most significantly,
what standard should the Court apply in reviewing a legislature's
judgment relating to deterrence and/or retribution? Since Justice
White and Justice Stewart appear to be the "pivotal" swing votes,5"
the answers to these questions may prove critical in determining the
ultimate constitutionality of capital punishment.
The dissent's view of deterrence is radically different. After ini-
tially suggesting that a conclusive demonstration that the death
53. Id. at 311-12.
54. Id. at 307 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 311 (White, J., concurring).
55. Justice White did note that it was unnecessary for him to decide whether the death
penalty as such is "a more effective deterrent than a lesser punishment." Id. at 312.
56. Id. at 307-08 (footnote omitted).
57. See id. at 400 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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penalty lacked efficacy as a deterrent would not be constitutionally
relevant,- the dissent nevertheless examined the empirical evidence
relating to deterrence. Starting with the premise that a legislative
judgment on this issue would be subject to attack only if it were
demonstrated that there was no rational basis for concluding that
the death penalty was a more effective deterrent than other types
of punishment," the dissent concluded that in view of the inconclu-
sive results from the empirical data, 0 the legislature's judgment
regarding deterrence must be allowed to stand.
The dissent's view of the Court's role makes it virtually impossi-
ble for abolitionists to establish the death penalty's inefficacy as a
deterrent on the basis of empirical evidence.
III. TESTING THE VALIDITY OF THE NEW STATUTES UNDER Furman
The Furman majority's focus upon the results produced by jury-
discretionary capital punishment indicates that Furman is prem-
ised upon the view that this system produces a constitutionally
intolerable pattern of death sentences." Although the Court limited
its holding to invalidating capital sentences imposed pursuant to
the jury-discretionary system, the rationale of the concurring Jus-
tices is broad enough to invalidate any system of capital punish-
ment which allows a discretionary judgment to produce a rare, arbi-
trary, freakish and discriminatory application of the death pen-
alty.62
Administration of the new statutes-both "mandatory" and
"guided discretionary"-will obviously involve significant discre-
tionary judgments because the statutes function in a system which
is honeycombed with discretion. The prosecutor's virtually
unlimited discretion-both in initiating charges and in accepting
guilty pleas to lesser-included charges-has always been widely ex-
ercised in capital cases."3 When a capital case comes to trial, the jury
58. Id. at 451 (Powell, J., dissenting); id. at 375 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 454-55 (Powell, J., dissenting). See also Chief Justice Burger's comment that
"the questions raised by the necessity approach are beyond the pale of judicial inquiry under
the Eighth Amendment." Id. at 396.
60. Id. at 396 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
61. See text at notes 12-34 supra.
62. See, e.g., Justice Stewart's language quoted in text at note 31 supra.
63. See, e.g., Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 50,
53 (1968); Carney & Fuller, A Study of Plea Bargaining in Murder Cases in Massachusetts,
3 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 292 (1969); White, Book Review, 74 COL. L. REv. 319, 324 (1974).
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has significant discretion, even under a mandatory system, because
of its obligation to consider the relatively amorphous elements and
defenses relevant to all capital charges," and its inherent power to
nullify capital punishment by acquitting the defendant 5 or convict-
ing him of a lesser-included non-capital offense which is not sup-
ported by the evidence.6 Moreover, if a capital sentence is imposed,
trial and appellate courts may still utilize various discretionary
techniques to avoid its execution; 7 and, when all judicial remedies
are exhausted, the executive's virtually unlimited power to grant
clemency may be exercised to spare the defendant's life. 8 Unless a
new statute eliminated these discretionary devices, the shift from a
"jury-discretionary" system to a "mandatory" or a "guided discre-
tionary" system would appear to be a change in form only-a
change that will not substantially alter the way in which the death
penalty will be applied. 9 Abolitionists will undoubtedly argue that
64. See, e.g., Justice Cardozo's comments on the legal definition of premeditation:
What we have is merely a privilege offered to the jury to find the lesser degree when
the suddenness of the intent, the vehemence of the passion, seems to call irresistibly
for the exercise of mercy. I have no objection to giving them this dispensing power,
but it should be given to them directly and not in a mystifying cloud of words.
B. CARDOZO, LAW AND LrrERATUR 99-101 (1931). See generally Black, The Crisis in Capital
Punishment, 31 MD. L. REV. 289, 295-300 (1971).
65. See generally Mackey, The Inutility of Mandatory Capital Punishment, 54 B.U.L.
REV. 32 (1974).
66. In most jurisdictions, conviction of a lesser-included non-capital offense will be sus-
tained even though the evidence presented to the jury shows the defendant was either guilty
of the capital offense or nothing. See, e.g., Taylor v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 587, 591, 43
S.E.2d 906, 908 (1947). Under the majority view, the judge in effect has discretion to decide
whether an unsupported lesser-included charge shall be submitted to the jury. Recently, the
Third Circuit decided that where the judge is explicitly vested with this discretion, he is
constitutionally obligated to instruct the jury as to the lesser-included offense, thereby insur-
ing they will have an opportunity to exercise their nullification power. See Matthews v.
Johnson, 502 F.2d 339 (3d Cir. 1974).
67. See, e.g., Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953) (dictum):
When the penalty is death, we, like state court judges, are tempted to strain the
evidence and even, in close cases, the law in order to give a doubtfully condemned man
another chance.
Id. at 196. For an analysis of one state supreme court's utilization of special standards of
review in capital cases, see McDonald, Capital Punishment in South Carolina: The End of
an Era, 24 S. CAR. L. REv. 762 (1972).
68. See generally Note, Executive Clemency in Capital Cases, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 136
(1964).
69. The change to a mandatory system will have the effect of shifting some of the discre-
tion exercised by the jury to others, particularly the prosecutor and the executive. By obscur-
ing the visibility of the discretionary judgments, this change can only increase the potential
for arbitrary and discriminatory application of the death penalty.
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in light of their predictable practical operation, the new statutes will
exhibit all of the vices Furman found to be antithetical to the values
of the eighth amendment.
What role may the social sciences have in substantiating or rebut-
ting this claim? Pending actual executions, empirical evidence re-
lating to the new statutes' operation will be incomplete.70 The data
relating to death sentences imposed, however, permit at least some
empirical testing of the extent to which a pattern of discriminatory,
arbitrary, or infrequent pattern of death sentences has resulted.
Under Justice Douglas' view of the eighth amendment, discrimi-
natory application of the death penalty is sufficiently established if
death penalties are disproportionately imposed upon minority
groups or the poor,7' or "if it is imposed under a procedure that gives
room for the play of such prejudices."72 In view of this test, data
exposing the extent to which a new system of capital punishment
has in fact been disproportionately imposed upon discrete groups of
the population would obviously be relevant to prove discrimination
in fact.73 In testing whether a procedure is one which allows room
for the play of prejudice, it would appear appropriate to examine the
extent to which any of the discretionary techniques available under
a new system were exercised in a discriminatory manner in the past.
If it can be- shown that prosecutorial plea-bargaining discretion,
executive clemency, or any of the other discretionary devices unal-
tered by the new system were previously exercised so as to discrimi-
nate against capital defendants of a certain race or economic class,74
this should be sufficient to establish, at least under the Douglas
rationale, that the new system of capital punishment is unconstitu-
tional.
In view of the position of Justice White and Justice Stewart,
empirical data evidencing the extent to which the new systems of
.70. Until a capital defendant is actually executed, it cannot be determined that the power
of executive clemency will not be exercised to spare the defendant's life.
71. See text at note 17 supra.
72. 408 U.S. at 242 (Douglas, J., concurring).
73. Furman indicates that in determining whether the application of a system of capital
punishment is in violation of the eighth amendment, the Court will examine results produced
by that system in the nation as a whole rather than in one particular state. See text at notes
12-34 supra. In view of the Court's role under the eighth amendment (i.e., gauging punish-
ments on the basis of a broad spectrum of community sentiment), this approach seems
appropriate.
74. See, e.g., Wolfgang, Kelly, & Nolde, Comparison of the Executed and the Commuted
Among Admissions to Death Row, 53 J. Cums. L.C. & P.S. 301 (1962).
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capital punishment produce arbitrary and infrequent results are
crucial. Testing the new systems' "frequency" will not always be
easy. Where a "guided-discretionary" system is in effect, comparing
the number of capital sentences imposed with the number of convic-
tions for capital crimes yields an estimate of the frequency with
which the death penalty is imposed.7" Discounting this estimate by
the percentage of death sentences previously commuted through
executive clemency" results in a somewhat more speculative esti-
mate of the execution rate which can be expected in the event the
"guided-discretionary" statutes are held constitutional. With the
"mandatory" statutes, measuring infrequency is more difficult. If
the statute is truly "mandatory" (in the sense that the death sen-
tence is automatically imposed upon conviction of a capital crime),
the number of defendants convicted of capital crimes will necessar-
ily equal the number sentenced to death. This ratio is misleading,
however, in that it fails to account for not only the potential capital
cases eliminated as a result of prosecutorial discretion," but also the
number of cases in which the jury exercised its nullification power
so as to avoid the automatic imposition of a death sentence which
would follow upon conviction of a capital crime.7" Since flexibility
at the sentencing stage has been stifled, the executive will be inc-
lined to "review more carefully sentences which were imposed with-
out any opportunity for the sentencer to be lenient."7 As a result,
the rate at which executive clemency was granted under a jury-
discretionary system is likely to underestimate the number of com-
mutations to be expected under a "mandatory" system.
Despite these difficulties, it seems probable the empirical data
will show that, for the most part, the new systems of capital punish-
ment do not alter the fact that the death penalty is infrequently
applied."0 Determining whether the new systems result in the arbi-
75. Of course, this "estimate" does not take account of the cases in which the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion eliminated the possibility of a capital conviction despite the fact the
state's evidence may have been sufficient to sustain such a conviction.
76. One would look to the percentage of death sentences commuted under the jury-
discretionary system which was previously in effect.
77. See text at note 63 supra.
78. See text at note 65 supra.
79. Note, Discretion and the Constitutionality of the New Death Penalty Statutes, 87
HARV. L. REV. 1690, 1716 (1974); see Note, Executive Clemency in Capital Cases, 39 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 136, 181 (1964).
80. As of August 28, 1974, there were 140 prisoners on death row in the United States.
Since these prisoners have accumulated over the two year post-Furman period, it appears
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trary infliction of capital punishment, however, will be even more
difficult. Because of the virtually infinite number of variables which
may be legitimately considered in determining whether a capital
sentence should be imposed, empirical data in the form of
comparisons between capital defendants spared and those executed
could probably never unequivocally demonstrate that the death
penalty was being arbitrarily applied.8' With respect to this issue,
the standard of scrutiny utilized by the Court in evaluating empiri-
cal evidence is crucial.
What standard of scrutiny should the Court apply? First, was it
proper for the Furman majority to reject the traditional approach
applied by the dissent? If abolitionists want to establish that the
death penalty is arbitrarily applied, should not they be required to
"undermine the general premise" that juries and agencies of the
state are acting rationally rather than discriminatorily or arbitrar-
ily? Should not legislation challenged under the cruel and unusual
punishment clause be entitled to the same presumption of constitu-
tionality accorded to a statute challenged under the due process
clause82 or the equal protection clause? 3
In answering these questions, one must begin with a proper under-
standing of the function of the cruel and unusual punishment
clause. The eighth amendment requires the Court to decide whether
a penalty enacted by the legislature is "cruel and unusual," i.e., one
that does not comply with our "evolving standards of decency."84
capital punishment is being imposed less frequently than in the sixties, when as Justice
Brennan noted, death penalties were imposed on an average of about 100 per year. 408 U.S.
at 291-92.
In some jurisdictions, however, the frequency with which the death penalty is being im-
posed has increased. For example, the North Carolina system which imposes capital punish-
ment upon conviction of first degree murder or rape has resulted in the imposition of the
death penalty upon 47 North Carolina defendants, a rate of imposition which is drastically
higher than that produced by the jury-discretionary system. Since a new system's constitu-
tionality must be determined on the basis of results produced in the nation as a whole, see
note 73 supra, a striking change in a single jurisdiction should not have any significant effect
upon the constitutional determination.
81. See, e.g., Winston v. United States, 172 U.S. 303, 313 (1899).
82. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729 (1963).
83. See Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 F.2d 138, 148 (8th Cir. 1968).
84. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (Warren, C.J.) (plurality opinion). The amendment
could have been interpreted to forbid only punishments not authorized by the legislature.
This interpretation, however, would appear contrary to the basic scheme of the Bill of Rights
because, unlike the other amendments contained in the Bill of Rights, the eighth amendment
would provide no check upon legislative excess. In any event, the Court has clearly held that
it must judge legislation enacting penalties against our "evolving standards of decency." See
note 10 supra.
Vol. 13: 279
Capital Punishment
This places the Court in an unusual role. Because of its representa-
tive character, the legislature generally has sole responsibility for
determining whether a law is decent or acceptable in terms of com-
munity values; the Court's role is limited to determining whether
the law is rationally related to a constitutionally permissive objec-
tive," or whether it infringes upon other interests protected by the
Constitution." The constitutional ban upon cruel and unusual pun-
ishments, however, reflects the view that when harsh punishments
are involved, the possibility that the legislature was influenced by
momentary impulses or overriding emotions makes it appropriate
for the Court to test the punishments' acceptability. When a pun-
ishment is challenged under the eighth amendment, the Court must
make the same type of judgment required of the legislature. In
weighing empirical evidence relevant to this judgment, it is not
appropriate for the Court to give its traditional deference to legisla-
tive findings. Precisely because the eighth amendment is to provide
protection against punishments which are a product of overriding
emotions, the Court should independently scrutinize empirical evi-
dence relating to the operation of a severe penalty so as to insure
that the penalty in fact reflects contemporary attitudes of decency
and is not merely a reflection of what the public will allow to be
placed on the statute books to be enforced in a non-regular fashion.
Where the uniquely severe penalty of death is involved, the Court
should insist that the state demonstrate at least, some degree of
rationality in the penalty's application. If the available empirical
evidence relating to a new system of capital punishment does not
establish some constitutionally permissible criteria for distinguish-
ing the few who are sentenced to death from the many who are
spared, this should be sufficient to establish an arbitrary infliction
of the death penalty within the meaning of the White-Stewart opin-
ions in Furman."
85. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955).
86. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (invalidating statute which in-
fringes upon constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press).
87. This analysis is consistent with the rationale articulated by Justice Stewart, because
Stewart's opinion appeared to conclude that where no legitimate basis is established for
distinguishing between capital offenders spared and those sentenced to death, the Court must
conclude the death penalty is arbitrarily inflicted. See text at notes 25-31 supra.
The analysis seems particularly appropriate in view of the fact the new systems of capital
punishment appear to be only formally different from the system invalidated in Furman. In
view of the way the total administration of justice operates, commentators and judges have
noted that limiting only sentencing discretion may "not make much of a practical difference."
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IV. BEYOND Furman
If a new system of capital punishment withstands scrutiny under
the rationale applied by the majority in Furman, the Court will be
forced to decide, among other things, whether the new system pro-
vides adequate procedural safeguards for defendants; whether the
new system operates so as to impose excessive penalties; and finally,
whether the death penalty per se is unconstitutional. Empirical
data from the social sciences could have a significant impact in
resolving each of these issues.
A. Procedural Safeguards
Litigation concerning procedural safeguards in capital cases will
probably continue to center upon various aspects of the jury trial,
especially the jury's function in determining guilt and penalty" and
the jury selection process.88 In scrutinizing a new capital punish-
ment system's method of jury selection, the role of the social sci-
ences could be particularly important. In Witherspoon v. Illinois,"°
the Court held that the practice of excluding for cause all veniremen
opposed to capital punishment or those who expressed conscientious
scruples against its infliction was unconstitutional because the re-
maining pool of potential jurors would be biased in favor of imposing
capital punishment." The Court limited the effect of its decision by
stating that the decision had no bearing on a state's power to ex-
clude veniremen who make it
unmistakably clear (1) that they would automatically vote
against the imposition of capital punishment . . . , or (2) that
their attitude toward the death penalty would prevent them
from making an impartial decision as to the defendant's guilt."
In reaching this result, the Court relied in part upon empirical
Wollan, The Death Penalty After Furman, 4 LoyoLA L.J. 339, 351 (1973). See Note, Discretion
and the Constitutionality of the New Death Penalty Statutes, 87 H Av. L. REv. 1690, 1716
n.176 (1974). It should, therefore, be especially incumbent upon the states to demonstrate
that a new system of capital punishment does not in fact operate so as to produce the same
vices condemned by the concurring Justices in Furman.
88. See, e.g., McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971) (upholding the constitution-
ality of a unitary trial procedure under which the same jury decides guilt and penalty in a
single proceeding).
89. See, e.g., Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 522-23.
92. Id. at 522-23 n.21.
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evidence which revealed that a substantial proportion of the popula-
tion was opposed to the death penalty." In dictum, the Court also
indicated that if future empirical evidence could substantiate the
claim that the exclusion of veniremen opposed to capital punish-
ment resulted in a jury which is "prosecution prone" with respect
to the determination of guilt, this might result in a holding that all
convictions rendered by those juries are constitutionally invalid.94
On the basis of Witherspoon, evaluation of empirical evidence
relating to the population's views on capital punishment and to a
death-qualified jury's proneness to convict will have an important
part in determining the constitutionality of a new capital punish-
ment system's jury selection process. If a "mandatory" selection
system provides for the exclusion of veniremen whose views on
capital punishment render them unable to make an "impartial deci-
sion," post- Witherspoon empirical data comparing attitudes and
simulated trial performances of death-qualified juries and normal
juries should be examined for the purpose of determining whether
the resulting jury is "prosecution prone."95 Empirical data measur-
ing the exclusionary test's effect on the jury population as a whole,
and the extent to which it disproportionately eliminates members
of discrete segments of the population, such as blacks or women,
should be scrutinized for the purpose of determining whether the
selection process results in a violation of the defendant's right to a
jury which represents a cross-section of the community." On the
other hand, if the "mandatory" system does not provide for any
form of death-qualification, empirical data relating to the popu-
lation's views on capital punishment would be important for the
purpose of determining the likelihood that a given jury would in
fact exercise discretion. If it appeared that, because of their views
on capital punishment, a sizeable proportion of the population
would, in at least some cases, refuse to vote for a verdict carrying
with it an automatic sentence of death, then abolitionists could
convincingly argue that the "mandatory" system is invalid under
Furman. Given the views of a sizeable proportion of the population
from which the jury is being chosen, the defendant is being sen-
93. Id. at 520 n.16.
94. Id. at 517-23.
95. See, e.g., Jurow, New Data on the Effect of a "Death Qualified" Jury on the Guilt
Determination Process, 84 HARv. L. REv. 567 (1971). See generally White, The Constitutional
Invalidity of Convictions Imposed by Death-Qualified Juries, 58 CORNELL L. REv. 1176 (1973).
96. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
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tenced pursuant to a "jury-discretionary" system in the sense that
at least a substantial proportion of the jury is in fact exercising
discretion as to whether or not a capital sentence will be imposed.
Where a "guided-discretionary" system is in effect, similar issues
will need to be resolved. If a bifurcated trial system is employed,"
the state may avoid some potential Witherspoon problems by
"using one jury to decide guilt and another to fix punishment." 8 In
this situation, however, the question arises as to whether it is pro-
cedurally fair to allow the defendant to be sentenced to death by a
jury which at best has an imperfect grasp of the evidence relating
to guilt.9 Empirical data obtained pursuant to simulated tests'0 or
questioning of jurors who actually participated in capital cases
might shed further light on this issue.
If, on the other hand, a unitary trial procedure is adopted, issues
relating to "prosecution proneness," the defendant's right to a rep-
resentative jury, and Furman's ban upon a jury-discretionary sys-
tem of capital punishment are presented in a slightly different con-
text.'"' Evaluation of the relevant empirical data would again be
essential to a proper resolution of these issues.' °0
B. Excessiveness
With respect to some statutes imposing mandatory capital pun-
ishment upon conviction, abolitionists may cogently argue that the
statute is constitutionally overbroad or "excessive" in the sense that
it requires the imposition of capital punishment upon conviction for
some crimes as to which the imposition of the death penalty would
97. Under such a system the questions of guilt and punishment are determined at sepa-
rate and discrete stages of the proceedings.
98. 391 U.S. at 520 & n.18.
99. Most importantly, the penalty jury would not be aware of the extent to which the first
jury might have felt some residue of doubt as to the defendant's guilt despite the fact that
they found him to be guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
100. A comparison could be made between the capital sentencing performance of jurors
who actually determine the guilt of a capital defendant and jurors who are merely told the
defendant is (or has been adjudicated) guilty of the capital crime.
101. For example, if the jury is "death-qualified," the "prosecution proneness" issue will
be somewhat different from that arising under a "mandatory" system because in this context,
the state does have the alternative for providing a split verdict procedure.
102. Empirical evidence dealing with the difficulties a penalty jury may have in determin-
ing sentence when it has not adjudicated the defendant's guilt may be more difficult to
obtain. Results from simulated trials, see note 100 supra, or interviews of jurors who have
participated in various types of capital trials could, however, supply some useful information.
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be a punishment disproportionate to the offense.'"3 The doctrine of
excessiveness was developed by the Supreme Court in Weems v.
United States.'°4 In determining whether a section of the Philippine
Code of Criminal Procedure was in violation of the eighth amend-
ment, the Court measured the statute's minimum penalty (12 years
imprisonment with hard and painful labor and accessory penal-
ties)' 5 against the minimum offense (making a single false. entry in
a public and official document) and illustrated the severity of the
law in question by comparing it with penalties required by other
criminal statutes both within the Philippines and in other jurisdic-
tions. Concluding that "[s]uch penalties for such offenses amaze
those . . .citizens [who] . . .believe . . . that punishment for
crime should be graduated and proportioned to the offense,"'0' the
Court held the law under which the defendant's sentence was im-
posed unconstitutional.
As Weems' reference to penalties which "amaze" ordinary citi-
zens suggests, whether a sentencing statute is excessive must ulti-
mately be determined on the basis of community sentiment.'10 In
gauging community sentiment, empirical data providing an accur-
ate index of the extent to which the population favors or opposes the
rigid application of capital punishment for particular crimes would
be indispensable.' 8 While dissenting in Furman, Justice Blackmun
103. Since our modern philosophy of sentencing focuses upon the individual characteris-
tics of the offender as much as the circumstances of the crime, see, e.g., Williams v. New
York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949), it seems evident the death penalty would be disproportionate to
the offense when automatically applied to some offenders who fall within the terms of the
new mandatory statutes.
Specific rape cases (and specific homicides as well) can be imagined in which the
conduct of the accused would render the ultimate penalty a grossly excessive punish-
ment.
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 461 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting).
104. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
105. The accessory penalties included civil disabilities and the requirement that the pris-
oner wear a chain hanging from the ankles and wrists during the entire term of imprisonment.
Id. at 364.
106. Id. at 366-67.
107. Id. See also Workman v. Commonwealth, 429 S.W.2d 374, 377 (Ky. 1968).
108. Constitutional issues will not, of course, be decided solely on the basis of the results
of public opinion sampling. A mere indication of the percentage of people who "favor" or
"oppose" a particular form of mandatory capital punishment would not provide substantial
guidance for a court. A more sophisticated form of sampling which focused upon an individ-
ual's willingness to see the death penalty imposed in discrete factual situations falling within
a mandatory statute would, however, provide somewhat firmer empirical evidence; and under
Weems and Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958), comparison of the challenged penalty with
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observed that legislation imposing mandatory capital punishment
upon conviction
is regressive and of an antique mold, for it eliminates the ele-
ment of mercy in the imposition of punishment. I thought we
had passed beyond that point in our criminology long ago." 9
If it appears that these views accurately reflect contemporary com-
munity sentiment, there is a compelling basis for invalidating some,
if not all, statutes imposing "mandatory" capital punishment on
the grounds that they are constitutionally excessive.
C. The Constitutionality of the Death Penalty Per Se
Ultimately, the Court will have to determine whether the penalty
of death is an acceptable punishment in our society. In deciding this
question, the Court should, of course, examine the empirical evi-
dence which points to societal acceptance or rejection of this
penalty." 0 If this evidence indicates the death penalty has become
"an indecency" which should not be tolerated in our society,'' this
will obviously end the Court's inquiry. But, if the evidence of socie-
tal rejection is less clear, the Court should evaluate empirical evi-
dence for the purpose of weighing the benefits to be achieved by
capital punishment against the cruelty which this punishment in-
flicts upon the individual.
Crucial to determining the benefits to be achieved by the death
penalty is an analysis of the empirical evidence relating to that
punishment's efficacy as a deterrent. What type of judicial stance
should the Court adopt in reviewing this evidence? Is it correct to
argue, as the dissent does, that so long as the evidence is inconclu-
sive, the implied legislative judgment that the penalty acts as a
deterrent must be accepted?"' Or should the Court base its decision
on the preponderance of the evidence?"'
the punishments prescribed in the same jurisdiction for equally or more serious offenses and
comparison of the challenged penalty with the punishments prescribed for the same offense
in other jurisdictions, or in other countries would also be relevant.
109. 408 U.S. at 413.
110. In making this determination, the Court should look to, among other things, the
extent to which the death penalty is even-handedly applied in society, the extent to which
there is a nation-wide or world-wide trend towards abolition, and the circumstances under
which the death penalty is actually executed.
111. Black, The Crisis in Capital Punishment, 31 MD. L. REV. 289, 290 (1971).
112. See text at notes 59-60 supra.
113. See text at notes 47-49 supra.
Vol. 13: 279
Capital Punishment
In resolving this issue, the Court's role must again be considered.
In determining whether a punishment is barred by the eighth
amendment, the Court is not reviewing legislation for the purpose
of deciding whether it is rationally related to a legitimate legislative
objective. Instead, it must essentially make an independent judg-
ment as to whether or not the punishment is, in fact, acceptable." 4
In making this type of judgment, the Court cannot give excessive
deference to the legislature's evaluation of the empirical studies. If
the conclusions to be drawn from the studies are inconclusive, in the
sense that some properly conducted studies indicate the death pen-
alty is a more efficacious deterrent than other penalties while others
indicate it is not, judicial deference to a legislative judgment that
the studies establishing the death penalty's efficacy as a deterrent
are more accurate would perhaps be appropriate.
As in the case of judicial review relating to the death penalty's
application,"5 however, the Court should demand rational justifica-
tion based upon proof before any implied claim relating to
deterrence is accepted. Given the significant amount of existing
data relating to deterrence," 6 the Court should not permit the legis-
lature to rely on assumptions which do not have an empirical basis.
If the results from the studies are inconclusive, in the sense that,
although consistent with the hypothesis that the death penalty is
not a more efficacious deterrent than other penalties, they do not
unequivocally demonstrate this proposition," 7 deference to the leg-
islature should at most allow them to conclude that there is some
possibility that in certain situations the death penalty is marginally
more effective than other punishments.
Defining the magnitude of the death penalty's efficacy as a deter-
rent is important because the Court is engaged in a balancing pro-
cess in which capital punishment's efficacy as a deterrent is but one
element to be considered. Even if the legislature can legitimately
conclude that, as it will be applied under a new system of capital
punishment, "' the death penalty will be a marginally more effective
114. See text at notes 84-87 supra.
115. See text at notes 86-87 supra.
116. See generally Bedau, Deterrence and the Death Penalty: A Reconsideration, 61 J.
CrM. L.C. & P.S. 539 (1970).
117. See, e.g., SEWIN STUDY discussed in note 45 supra.
118. Justice Brennan properly notes that the question of deterrence should not focus on
the abstract question of whether the death penalty in general is an optimal deterrent, but
rather upon whether the system of capital punishment which is being applied is in fact a more
efficacious deterrent than other forms of punishment. See text at note 49 supra.
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deterrent than other punishments, the Court must still decide
whether this benefit is sufficient to outweigh the mental and physi-
cal anguish which is inflicted upon those who are condemned to
death and those who are in fact executed.
The second part of this balancing process will be difficult for two
reasons. First, providing an accurate estimate of the extent to which
an executed individual suffers is obviously impossible. There is no
scientific method available for determining whether there is any
mode of execution which renders death instantaneous." 9 As Profes-
sor Black has said, "Here we knock on the door that never opens."'"0
Empirical evidence can play a role, however, in documenting the
extent to which an impending execution inflicts mental anguish
upon a condemned man. Up-to-date studies which show the extent
to which the new systems of capital punishment are in fact forced
to postpone execution in order to ensure compliance with due pro-
cess of law will provide some index of the length of individual suffer-
ing; and psychological studies of condemned or formerly condemned
men may provide empirical support for the California Supreme
Court's conclusion that "the process of carrying out a verdict of
death is often so degrading and brutalizing to the human spirit as
to constitute psychological torture."' 2 '
The second difficulty with the balancing process is determining
where the balance should be struck. To what extent will an incre-
ment in deterrence of serious crimes justify a process which inflicts
severe mental anguish upon individuals? Even if it could be shown
that a system of capital punishment as applied in fact will deter
criminals somewhat more effectively than other punishments, is
this societal benefit sufficient to justify the system's infliction of
suffering upon those who are condemned and executed? If the eighth
amendment indeed provides a check upon legislative excess,' 2  the
Court must resolve this kind of issue not by deferring to the legisla-
ture,' 2 but by drawing upon accepted standards of morality for the
purpose of determining whether the benefits to be achieved by the
death penalty are worth the cost of the untold mental anguish in-
flicted by that punishment.
119. See H. BARNES & N. TEErERS, NEW HORIZONS IN CRIMINOLOGY 306-09 (3d ed. 1959);
Comment, The Death Penalty Cases, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 1268, 1338 (1968).
120. Black, The Crisis in Capital Punishment, 31 MD. L. REv. 289, 292 (1971).
121. People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 649, 493 P.2d 880, 894, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, 166
(1972) (footnote omitted).
122. See text at notes 84-85 supra.
123. But see Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 465 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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V. CONCLUSION
Justice Holmes once noted:
If your subject is law, the roads are plain to anthropology, the
science of man, to political economy, the theory of legislation,
ethics, and thus by several paths to your final view of life.1 4
In determining the constitutionality of capital punishment, the in-
terdependence between the law and other disciplines is obvious.
While Furman invalidated the jury-discretionary system of capital
punishment on the ground that the system resulted in an unconsti-
tutional application of the death penalty, the Court did not decide
the constitutional validity of other systems of capital punishment,
leaving open not only the question of whether a new system could
be constitutionally applied, but also issues relating to procedural
fairness in administering the death penalty, whether the death pen-
alty is a constitutionally excessive punishment for certain crimes,
and whether the death penalty as such is unconstitutional.
An analysis of these issues shows none of them can be intelligently
resolved without the evaluation of empirical data drawn from the
social sciences. Although a great deal of relevant empirical data
already exists, accumulation of additional data which will not only
update prior studies but permit the exploration of new issues, is
highly desirable, if not indispensable.
124. THE MIND AND FAITH OF JUSTICE HOLMES 32 (Lerner ed. 1943).
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